Many experts claim that the incidence of suicide attacks is driven by religious cleavages. To test this hypothesis, we investigate whether the total number of suicide attacks per violent conflict or the annual number of suicide attacks per country is associated with simmering religious conflicts. We distinguish between two kinds of religious cleavages: cleavages at the macro level between the stake holders in violent conflicts and cleavages at the micro or battle field level between the actual perpetrators and victims of suicide attacks. Our results do not indicate that religious cleavages are an important precondition for the incidence of suicide attacks.
Introduction
The declared intention to die in order to kill others turns a suicide attacker into a powerful, highly dangerous, and utterly unpredictable weapon. Not only are suicide attacks more expedient than other forms of terrorism, they also require fewer resources and less preparation than traditional means of combat. 4 In some conflicts, suicide attacks have therefore become an effective strategy; in Iraq, for example, they have caused 19% of all civilian victims between 2003 and 2010 (26% of injured civilians and 11% of civilian deaths). 5 In most other violent conflicts, suicide terrorism does however hardly influence the run of events. The major political concern in these countries relates to the collateral damage caused by the countermeasures that are liable to undermine the foundations of free societies.
The purpose of this study is to investigate whether the incidence of suicide attacks are driven by religious cleavages. Apart, perhaps, from the hypothesis that suicide attacks are provoked by democratic states occupying foreign territories, the most prominent hypothesis advocated in the literature is that suicide terrorism has religious roots.
Some experts have conjectured that Muslim fundamentalism is the root cause of suicide attacks. Israeli (2002) is a case in point. He argues that suicide terrorists like to think of themselves as defenders of occupied Muslim territories who rescue Islam from evil westernization. Berman and Laitin (2008) , on the other hand, find that suicide terrorists are not primarily motivated by religious concerns. Even though suicide attackers often are members of radical religious sects, a fact that has been confirmed in a recent empirical study by Santifort-Jordan and Sandler (2014) , Berman and Laitin argue that it is not the religious 4 The first suicide attacks in modern conflicts were carried out in the 1 fervor that drives suicide attacks but rather the ability of closely-knit sects to protect their high-stake attacks against defection. 6 In this view, the affiliation of suicide terrorists with radical religious sects is not a signal of religious delusion but of commitment to the organization whose objectives transcend its theological foundations.
Other experts, for example Bloom (2005) and Pape (2005) , also argue that suicide attackers are not necessarily Muslim fundamentalists or, for that matter, any other kind of religious fanatics. In the view of these authors, suicide terrorism is not fueled by religion per se but rather by religious cleavages between attackers and victims. Pape (2005) , in particular, puts forward an innovative, though highly controversial argument. 7 He contends that all suicide terrorists share the secular and strategic goal of compelling democracies to withdraw military forces from territory that the terrorists consider to be their homeland. According to Pape, this kind of nationalism gives rise to rebellion which, in turn, engenders suicide attacks.
To accomplish their strategic goal, terrorist organizations use religious cleavages as a tactical device. If the foreign occupier and the local community have different religious affiliations,
terrorists have an easy job of uniting their constituency by portraying the conflict as a zerosum situation, demonizing the opponent, and grant the suicide terrorists the status of martyrs.
8 6 Pittel and Rübbelke (2006) show in a theoretical study how individual terrorists are led to develop a strong feeling of belongingness to the organization which then directs them towards committing suicide attacks. The benefits associated with belonging to a terrorist organization are, of course, likely to be outbalanced by the cost of the attack. Under which circumstances the decision to commit a suicide attack is time-inconsistent and what mechanisms might prevent time-inconsistency is analyzed in Pittel and Rübbelke (2012) . 7 See Bloom (2005) , Cook (2007) , Wade and Reiter (2007) , Piazza (2008) , and Collard-Wexler et al. (2013) for extensions and critical assessments of Pape's theory. 8 See Pape (2005: 89-92 ) for a detailed discussion.
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These early studies on suicide terrorism yielded interesting insights into the driving forces of suicide terrorism, but they lack a firm empirical basis. The well received study by Abadie (2006) constitutes an exception. In a cross-country regression analysis, Abadie (2006) does not find any relationship between religious fractionalization and risk from terrorist attacks at the country level. In our study we also use macro units of analysis, i.e. entire countries and violent conflicts. We do, however, explore a special type of terrorist attacks, namely suicide terrorism, and employ two different concepts of religious cleavages: the traditional macro concept that associates the conflict parties with religious creeds, and a new micro concept that identifies religious cleavages with the help of religious beliefs held by the directly involved parties, the terrorist organization and its victims.
Just as Abadie (2006) The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we review the related empirical literature.
In Section 3 we empirically investigate whether religious cleavages between conflict parties are correlated with the incidence of suicide terrorism, and in Section 4 we use our selfcompiled religious cleavage data to investigate whether different religious affiliations of perpetrators and victims are related to the incidence of suicide terrorism. Section 5 concludes.
Related literature

Terrorism in general
Systematic empirical research on the causes of terrorism at large is by now a firmly established field in political science and economics. 10 International terrorism, in particular, has received a great deal of scholarly scrutiny (Sandler and Enders 2004 , Shughart 2006 , Enders et al. 2011 . Nonetheless, some fundamental issues are still hotly debated. Most studies find, for example, that the socio-economic development of a country does not significantly affect terrorism. A case in point is the study by Kis-Katos et al.
(2011) providing evidence that terrorism is not rooted in economic deprivation. High levels of unemployment do however help terrorist organizations to recruit better educated suicide terrorists who are able to attack more valuable targets (Benmelech et al. 2012) . Freytag et al. (2011) , on the other hand, maintain that socio-economic variables do matter for terrorism, implying that terrorism might be reduced by economic development and growth, and Caruso and Schneider (2011) confirm that in Western Europe the classical economic concept of opportunity cost is indeed predicative of an individual's willingness to be involved in a terrorist activity. In any event, the scholarly consensus appears to converge to the stylized 10 See the surveys by Krieger and Meierrieks (2011) and Gassebner and Luechinger (2011). fact that the relationship between poverty and terrorism is highly non-linear (hump-shaped) and varies according to the specific circumstances; the low income explanation of terrorism applies better to the perpetrators' home country than to the venue country (Enders et al. 2014 ).
Not controversial is that the viability of a terrorist organization heavily depends on the public opinion in the organization's constituency. Especially an unfavorable opinion towards the target increases community support which, in turn, facilitates recruitment, reduces the danger of detection, and helps rendering terrorist attacks acceptable for the community (Pape, 2005) . These channels of influence give rise to a robust positive relationship between public support for terrorism and terrorist attacks (Malečková and Stanišić, 2011 Terrorisms has also been associated with attendant market reactions (Kollias et al., 2011) , FDI flows , and human rights (Dreher et al., 2011) . To counter these adverse effects, stake holders can seek corporate terrorist insurance (Michel-Kerjan and Raschky, 2011) and target countries can resort to protective measures, including military missions (Enders et al., 1990) . The effectiveness of such protective measures depends, of course, on the attendant circumstances. The international counter-piracy mission in the Gulf of Aden, for example, has been a qualified success (Shortland and Vothknecht, 2011) , whereas the effectiveness of other missions is more doubtful. Homeland security measures are, as a rule, less costly than military missions, but they nevertheless may come at a high cost in terms of forgone individual liberty, the prime example being the backlash of the "Snowden affair" of 2013. The willingness to trade off security for liberties does, of course, depend on the individual assessment of the pertaining terrorist risk (Bozzoli and Müller, 2011 ).
Suicide terrorism 7
The literature on suicide terrorism is much smaller than the literature on terrorism in general.
Simply classing suicide terrorism with terrorism in general is however not always expedient as Seifert and McCauley (2014) Pape's early contribution (Pape, 2003) and the monograph based thereon (Pape, 2005) are fundamental for the literature on suicide attacks. Pape (2005) focuses on the relationship between religious cleavages and suicide terrorism and identifies nationalism as the main root of suicide terrorism. Nationalism is defined as "the belief among members of a community that they share a distinct set of ethnic, linguistic, and historical characteristics and are entitled to govern their national homeland without interference from foreigners" (p.79). Many scholars argue that from this set of cultural differences, language is the most important attribute indicating the identities of the foreign occupiers and the local community. Pape, however, claims that under extreme situations, such as war or foreign military occupation, "the relative importance of religious and linguistic differences normally reverse and religious difference can inflame nationalist sentiments in ways that encourage mass support for martyrdom and suicide terrorism" (p.88). A religious cleavage between the occupier and the occupied allows terrorist organizations to portray the enemy in the most negative way possible in order to gain mass support for the resistance. Religious motives may also foster the willingness to die and the willingness to kill others since "rewards in the afterlife will compensate them from losing their lives in suicide attacks, but not if they kill coreligionists" (Berman and Laitin 2008: 1949) . Analyzing 58 "democratic occupations" (which include 56 8 cases of democratic states controlling the homeland of a distinct national minority within its own borders and two foreign military occupations), Pape (2005) indeed finds that from 1980 to 2003 suicide terrorist campaigns were most likely under democratic occupations characterized by religious differences between the "occupier" and the group that perceives occupation.
Pape's research method is, however, in many respects questionable (see Wade and Reiter, 2007, and Seifert and McCauley, 2014 Reiter (2007) out that when restricting perceived occupation to religiously dissimilar minorities, the effect of religious cleavages on the incidence of suicide attacks cannot be identified anymore. As a consequence, they distinguish perceived occupations (foreign occupations or domestic separatist movements) that are characterized by religious cleavages between occupiers and 9 occupied from perceived occupations that are not burdened with a religious cleavage.
Otherwise, the research designs of Collard-Wexler et al. (2014) and Wade and Reiter (2007) are very similar. With respect to the control variable that is relevant in our context, CollardWexler et al. (2014) find that religious cleavages have only a statistically and substantially significant effect on the incidence of suicide attacks if the perceived occupier is a foreign agent.
Piazza (2008) and 2006 as the units of analysis, the dependent variable being the number of deaths per attack. He finds that suicide attacks by terrorist groups with a religious ideology cause more deaths than attacks carried out by terrorists with nationalist or leftist ideologies. More relevant for our study is that religious cleavages between terrorists and victims (as measured by the number of sizeable minority religions) were not shown to have a statistically significant impact on the death toll of the suicide attacks.
Religious cleavages in conflicts
Data and descriptive statistics
We begin by analyzing the incidence of suicide terrorist attacks in violent conflicts. The unit of analysis thus consists of conflicts. Our sample includes 141 conflicts in the period 1981-2010. Table 1 presents a list of the 85 countries that were involved in these conflicts. The conflict sample is taken from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset by Gleditsch et al. (2002 Gleditsch et al. ( ), version 4-2011 In this dataset an armed conflict is defined as "a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths". 12 Table 1 indicates that various countries have experienced more than one conflict. Since the incidence of suicide attacks varies a great deal even across conflicts in one country, we chose to focus on the number of suicide attacks per conflict and not per country. Some conflicts gave rise to transnational suicide attacks; we also included these incidences. 13 The dependent variable is thus the total number of conflict-induced suicide attacks over the period 1981-2010. The main explanatory variable is the presence or absence of a religious cleavage between the two conflicting parties.
Data on suicide attacks
We use the data on suicide attacks from Pape's Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism.
This database includes "every suicide attack in which at least one terrorist killed himself or herself while attempting to kill others; it excludes attacks authorized by a national government" (Pape 2005: 3) . Conflicts between the governments of two countries are thus excluded from our sample. Pape draws the information "from suicide terrorist groups themselves, from the main organizations that collect such data in target countries and from news media around the world" (p. 4). His database was criticized by some experts since the circumstances that qualify an attack to be classified as relating to a suicide terrorist campaign are not well defined. This classification problem is however not relevant for our study because our dependent variable is the number of suicide attacks on the territory of the included countries and thus does not rely on a particular definition describing "suicide terrorist campaigns". We admit that our data is not free of potential measurement errors because of the uncertainty related to the reported incidents. Wade and Reiter (2007) 
Data on religious cleavages between parties engaged in violent conflict
We measure religious differences with the help of Lindberg's (2008) cleavage. Yet the involvement of USA and other Christian European countries was certainly perceived by the rebel groups as a major threat to the Islamic world. Hence we label these two conflicts as reflecting religious cleavages beginning with the year in which foreign forces became involved in the conflicts.
Correlation between suicide terrorism and religious cleavages in conflicts
To illustrate the correlation between the incidence of suicide terrorism and religious cleavages we examine the number of suicide terrorist attacks in conflicts with and without a religious cleavage. Table 2 shows that in conflicts in which religious differences play no role, the incidence of suicide terrorist attacks is smaller than in conflicts fraught with a religious cleavage.
Among the 117 conflicts in which no suicide attacks occurred, 62 conflicts are characterized by the absence of any religious cleavage, whereas 55 are characterized by a religious cleavage. And among the conflicts in which suicide attacks were actually used to terrorize the population of the opponent, it appears that religious cleavages between the conflict parties led to a higher incidence of suicide terrorist attacks. This positive correlation could, of course, be driven by some other factors, such as economic prosperity, specific cultural traits, or the nature of the conflict. To test the hypothesis that religious cleavages between the conflict parties are conducive to using suicide terrorism more rigorously, we therefore now turn to an econometric analysis.
Econometric analysis
The econometric model
The baseline econometric model has the following form: Table A1 presents descriptive statistics of all variables included in the model.
Since the dependent variable is an event count, estimating the model by OLS is likely to be inefficient, inconsistent, and biased (Long, 1997) . Our data are also overdispersed. We therefore apply a negative binomial regression. Suicide attacks are a rare event: only in 12% of all conflicts terrorists made use of suicide attacks. The Vuong test shows that the negative binomial model is preferred to a zero-inflated negative binomial model in some specifications. In the baseline model, we report results of the negative binomial regression and discuss the results of the zero-inflated negative binomial model below. (2), (5) and (6) but lack statistical significance in columns (1), (3), (4), (7) and (8). Including the regional dummy variables especially renders the religious cleavage variable to lack statistical significance. This indicates that a religious cleavage between the conflict parties is not conducive to suicide terrorism. This result not only contrasts with the first impression gained from the numbers reported in Table 2 , it also contrasts with the existing empirical evidence on the relationship between suicide terrorism and religious cleavages.
Results
The coefficient estimates of the control variables are statistically significant in some cases and have the expected signs. The population variable has the expected positive sign and is statistically significant at the 10% level in column (2), but lacks statistical significance in columns (6) and (8). The per capita GDP variable and the democracy variable do not turn out to be statistically significant. The Muslim variable has the expected positive sign and is statistically significant at the 1% level in column (5) and at the 5% level in columns (6) (Table 4) .
When we estimate a zero-inflated negative binomial model, the coefficient of the baseline religious cleavage variable does not turn out to be statistically significant in any specification. The coefficient of the religious cleavage variable considering religious 18 We also included the CCE index together with the square CCE index to test whether the relationship between terrorism and democracy is hump-shaped as hypothesized by Bueno de Mesquitas (2013) who infers this relationship from a model in which the endogenous choice of rebel tactics depends on the availability of outside opportunities. We did not find any evidence for a hump-shaped relationship, perhaps because suicide attacks are a viable option even under severe political repression, whereas other forms of terrorism are not (indicating again that suicide attacks are not a minor variation of terrorism at large).
denominations is statistically significant at the 10% level in one specification and has a negative sign.
Religious cleavages between terrorists and victims
Data and descriptive statistics
We now shift our focus from the macro level of religious cleavages, i.e. from cleavages between the conflict parties, to the micro level, i.e. to religious differences between the attackers and their victims. The unit of analysis is now the countries that have suffered the respective attacks. To investigate whether the incidence of suicide attacks is influenced by religious differences at the micro level between the actual attackers and victims, we compiled a new dataset that assigns religious affiliations to the terrorists and their victims. Table 5 lists the countries involved, the respective number of suicide attacks, and the number of suicide attacks in which the terrorist and the victims can be associated with different religions.
Data on religious cleavages between attackers and victims
The CPOST database includes details about the targets, the perpetrators, and newspaper articles describing the incidents. Missing targets are very rare. If the targets are military forces, civilians, public places, embassies, or public buildings (e.g., governmental buildings),
we coded the target's religion as the predominant religion of the target population. To identify the predominant religion in a country/area of a country/city we employed various datasets: the Fractionalization dataset by Alesina et al. (2003) The identity of the terrorist groups responsible for the attacks is missing in several cases since no group claimed responsibility for the attacks (e.g., in Afghanistan and Iraq).
However, for conflicts with a substantial track record of suicide attacks we assign to the unknown perpetrators the religion of the terrorist groups known to have conducted attacks on similar targets. In case of unknown perpetrators of an attack in a country that has not suffered from similar attacks before, we cannot avoid having a missing value. We identify the religious affiliation of the terrorist groups that conducted suicide attacks from Pape and 20 Although according to Alesina (2003) had the same religion in less than 50%. We also disaggregated the religious cleavage indicator and distinguished between different types of cleavages (see Table 6 ). In 4% of all suicide attacks, Hindus attacked Buddhist victims, in 65% Muslims attacked Muslim victims, in 20% Muslims attacked Christians, etc.
Descriptive statistics
Econometric analysis
We now use an econometric model to explain the incidence of suicide terrorism by the country-specific share of attacks in which terrorists and victims belong to different types of religions. This variable captures an entirely different cleavage dimension than the standard variable which identifies religious cleavages with different creeds of the involved conflict parties. Our variable relates to the micro structure of suicide terrorism, whereas the traditional approach focuses on the macro structure.
The econometric model
Our baseline panel data model has the following form: Cheibub et al. (2010) and assumes the value 1 when a country is democratic and 0 otherwise. It is conceivable that suicide attacks also influence political institutions. To avoid concerns of reverse causality, we regress the number of suicide attacks in period t on democracy in period t-1. Religion
Attacker ikt is a set of variables that capture the annually measured share of suicide attackers belonging to one of the following four religions: Hinduism, Islam, Sikhism, and Secular. The reference category is Hinduism, i.e. the regression results signify deviations from this reference category. Lastly, η i represents a fixed country effect, ε t is a fixed period effect, and u it is the error term. Table A2 in the appendix presents descriptive statistics of all variables included in the model. We estimate a fixed effects negative binomial panel regression model. Table 7 shows the base-line estimates (coefficient estimates). Similar to the cross-sectional model in Section 3, the coefficient estimates of the religious cleavage variable do not turn out to be statistically significant.
Results
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The coefficient estimates of the GDP, population, and democracy variables also lack statistical significance. 22 By contrast, a country's history with suicide terrorism is significant.
The estimated coefficient for the lagged dependent variable in column (7) has a positive sign and is statistically significant at the 1% level, indicating the unsurprising fact that countries that experienced suicide attacks on their territories are more prone to suffer from such an attack in the following year.
The Muslim attacker variable is statistically significant at the 1% level in columns (6) and ( When we exclude the suicide attacks in Sri Lanka, the coefficient estimate of the Muslim attacker variable does not turn out to be statistically significant anymore.
The Sunni-Shia cleavage
Several Islamic states are plagued by growing sectarian violence between Sunni and Shia Muslims. This kind of violence is especially prevalent in Iraq and Pakistan where a large number of suicide attacks are targeted at Shia pilgrims, mosques, and civilians living in Shia neighborhoods. In a second specification of our model we acknowledge these intra-religious conflicts and consider a religious cleavage to exist when the attacker and the target adhere to 22 Replacing the democracy-dictatorship variable by Cheibub et al. (2010) by the Constraints on Chief
Executive index does not change the inferences regarding the religious cleavage variable, nor other variables.
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different denominations of Islam. This implies for our analysis that we have to distinguish between the Sunni, Shia, Sufi, and Ahmadiyya branches of Islam.
In the following, we explain our strategy of assigning religious denominations to the victims of suicide attacks in Afghanistan and Iraq. These attacks represent about 67% of all attacks in our sample. We use a similar strategy for all other countries. First we set aside the attacks for which we already know that the terrorists and their victims belong to two different religions, for example Islam and Christianity. This leaves us with the cases in which both attackers and victims are Muslim. We assign to all terrorists the denomination 'Sunni' since all groups known to have conducted suicide attacks in Afghanistan or Iraq before 2010 are Sunni extremists.
Assigning religious denominations to the victims of suicide terrorism it not a straightforward exercise. In addition to the CPOST database, we used the RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents and the Global Terrorism Database which sometimes offer information about the religious denomination of the victims. We were able to identify the attacks against Shia mosques, pilgrims and other gatherings, as well as attacks against other denominations such as the Sufi and Ahmadiyya branches of Islam. Attacks targeted at government officials or group leaders are more difficult to classify: in some cases we managed to determine the religious denomination of the victim, but these kinds of attacks are responsible for most of the missing values in our dataset. Afghanistan has a Sunni majority, only 10-15% of the population is Shia. 23 We therefore code Afghani security forces, administrative bodies, and general civilian targets as 'Sunni'. Iraq, on the other hand, has a mixed Sunni-Shia population. The Shia population is concentrated in the southern provinces and amounts to 65-70%. 24 We code Iraqi security forces, administrative bodies, and general This classification exercise leaves our sample of suicide attacks with 2071 observations which represent 97% of the attacks listed in the CPOST database.
The results reported in Tables 8 and 9 show that inferences do not change when the religious cleavage variable includes the Sunni-Shia cleavage, coding victims in Bagdad and Kirkuk provinces as Shia, Sunni, or dropping the respective observations altogether.
Conclusions
In some violent conflicts, suicide attacks are extensively used as a means of warfare, whereas in others we do not observe any suicide attacks at all. What is the reason for this discrepancy?
One of the answers provided by recent research is that suicide terrorism is much more likely to be used in conflicts characterized by religious cleavages between the fighting parties. This To test Pape's religious cleavage hypothesis again, we developed a new research method. We employed the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset by Gleditsch et al. (2002) to select the relevant universe of observations. In a cross-conflict analysis we relied on the macro coding of religious cleavages in violent conflicts by Lindberg (2008) . In a selfcollected dataset, we measure religious cleavages with the help of a new concept that is based on the micro-cleavages between terrorists and victims of the individual suicide attacks. Since this measure can only be obtained for countries that actually have suffered from suicide attacks, we have to work with a substantially reduced sample and therefore cannot use a cross-country analysis but exploit a panel structure to arrive at a workable sample size.
In our cross-conflict analysis on the incidence of suicide attacks we followed Abadie (2006) and chose our units of analysis to consist of entire conflicts because using conflictyears as the unit of analysis artificially increases the sample size without adding substantially new information. Moreover, some conflicts lasted much longer than others, with the consequence that these conflicts have a larger weight in panel regressions. All in all, these caveats suggest that the relatively high statistical significance of the estimates in such panel models needs to be interpreted very cautiously. We prefer to play it safe and to work with a much smaller sample size in a cross-conflict approach. Our results do not show that religious cleavages are an important precondition for the incidence of suicide attacks.
26 Table 1 List of countries involved in armed conflicts in the period 1981-2010. Classical standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 Classical standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 Classical standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 Classical standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 www.wiwi.uni-konstanz.de/econdoc/working-paper-series/
